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ARGUMENT 
1. The limited case law addressing the interplay of the Governmental Immunity 
Act of Utah ("UGIA") and the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act 
("WBA") supports Appellant's position. 
A. The cases and authority cited by Appellant have been properly 
interpreted and applied, and favor Appellant's position. 
Appellee insists that Appellant has "erred" in relying upon Hall v. Utah State Depart, of 
Corrections, 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 958, Fannen v. Uhi City, 2005 UT App 301U, No. 20040723-
CA (Utah Cr. App. June 20, 2009) (mem.) and Youren v. Tintic School Dist. 343 F.3d 1296 (10th 
Ck., 2003) in support of his position that the filing of a notice of claim that includes a WBA 
cause of action within the 180-day statutory period is sufficient to satisfy the requkement in 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-4(2). In fact, Appellant's citation to, and analysis of these cases is 
appropriate and accurate. 
Concerning Hall, Appellant noted: "The relevance of the Hall decision is that even 
though the UGIA does not protect governmental entities from WBA suits, plaintiffs must 
still strictly comply with UGIA's notice of claim requkements regardless of the claim 
asserted. In the instant case, Appellant did comply with the notice of claim requkements." 
[Appellant's Brief, p. 16]. A discussion of Hall'is instructive only because it sets the general 
rule that a cause of action for which governmental immunity has been waived must still be 
disclosed through the timely filing of a notice of claim per Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401 
through 403. Appellant complied with this rule. 
Appellee argues that the Fannen decision contradicts Appellant's position. This is 
incorrect. Close attention must be paid to the Fannen court's language. Fannen's argument 
was that the WBA's 180-day statutory limitation is superseded by the language in the UGIA 
that provides that "[a] claim against a governmental entity" is barred "unless notice of claim 
is filed ... within one year after the claim arises." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-402. 
Stated in the alternative, Fannen asserted that the UGLVs one-year notice of claim 
requirement rendered the WBA's (shorter) 180-day period filing requirement moot. 
Unlike the Appellant in the instant case, Fannen had not filed a notice of claim within 
the 180-day WBA filing period. 
The Fannen court ruled: 
While the WBA creates a cause of action that must be brought within 180 
days after the alleged occurrence, the [U]GIA "does not itself serve as the 
basis for liability or any cause of action." Hall v. Department of Com, 2001 UT 
34,^ [ 16, 24 P.3d 958. The [UJGIA merely gives a deadline for which notice 
must be given that there is a claim against the State; it does not prohibit the 
legislature from imposing a shorter statutory filing date on a cause of action. 
Fannen v. Fehi City, at 301. 
After clarifying this rule, the court then pronounced that: "Because Fannen 
failed to file the Notice before the statutory period designated in the WBA, the district 
court properly dismissed his Whistle Blower claim (emphasis added)." Id. 
According to the court, it was Fannen's failure to file the notice of claim {not 
the complaint) before the 180-day statutory period mandated by the WBA that 
justified the dismissal of Fannen's WBA claim. 
Appellee's position would be defensible if the Fannen court had found that the 
dismissal of the WBA claim was proper because Fannen failed to file a complaint 
within the 180-day period. Instead, the court's clear implication is that the filing of 
the notice of claim within the 180-day period would have preserved Fannen's WBA 
claim. Appellant did file a notice of claim within the WBA's 180-day statutory period. 
Appellant's purpose in citing to Youren was to demonstrate that (at least in one other 
instance) the issue of whether the filing of a notice of claim within the 180-day WBA period 
sufficiently preserves a party's WBA claim has been addressed; and the federal district court 
judge addressing that issue found that the plaintiff in that case met the 180-day statue of 
limitations for bringing claims under the WBA by filing a timely notice of claim, even though 
the complaint was not filed until after the 180-day deadline. While the Youren decision is not 
binding or necessarily dispositive, it appears to be the only case on record that specifically 
mentions this narrow issue—and the brief mention is favorable to Appellant's position. 
The fact is that Appellee cannot point to any decision by any court that supports its 
position that the filing of a notice of claim within 180-days that includes a WBA cause of 
action is insufficient to preserve that cause of action, even when the complaint is filed after 
180 days. Appellant has, at least, provided judicial authority for his position. 
B. Appellant has clearly explained that the adverse action taken by 
Appellee was the denial of his reinstatement at the Appeals Board level 
after he had provided testimony against Mike Shaw at another hearing. 
Appellant clearly explained in his Brief that his WBA claim was principally based on 
the adverse action taken by Appellee when his reinstatement by the Appeals Board was 
denied. Appellant alleges that this decision was a result of his prior testimony against Mike 
Shaw at another employee's review hearing. This allegation was made in Appellant's Verified 
Complaint. 
Appellee insists on repeating the stale argument that Appellant admitted in his 
deposition that he was not terminated for "blowing the whistle" on Mike Shaw. In fact, 
Appellant claims that the adverse action was the denial of his reinstatement and benefits by 
the Appeals Board because Appellant had testified in a separate earlier hearing and had 
alleged that Mr. Shaw had wasted public funds, property and manpower. [R. 18-19]. 
Appellee suggests that Appellant "caused" the trial court to misunderstand the 
allegation in Appellant's Verified Complaint. The facts contained in paragraphs 152-57 of 
the Complaint are as follows: 
152. During the course of Plaintiffs employment, Plaintiff became aware that 
Defendant Unknown Persons 1-10 were wasting public funds, property, or 
manpower belonging to Defendant Washington City. 
153. Plaintiff notified Defendant Washington City, specifically at Ritch Johnson's 
administrative hearing before the Appeals Board, that Defendant Unknown 
Persons 1-10 (including Mike Shaw) were wasting public funds, property or 
manpower. 
154. During the week of October 13, 2004, Plaintiff, along with other employees of 
Defendant Washington City, were instructed by Rodger Carter, City Manager 
of Washington City, that it would be better if the employees did not attend or 
testify at Mr. Rich Johnson's appeal hearing. 
155. On November 18, 2004 Plaintiff appeared before the Appeals Board and 
testified during Mr. Johnson's appeal hearing that Defendant Unknown 
Persons 1-10, including Mike Shaw, had wasted public funds, property, or 
manpower belonging to Defendant Washington City and had used them for 
personal gain. 
156. Following Plaintiffs testimony at Mr. Johnson's hearing before the Appeals 
Board, Plaintiffs own appeal was denied. 
157. Defendants' decision regarding Plaintiffs appeal was made in retaliation for 
Plaintiffs prior testimony at Mr. Johnson's appeal hearing regarding 
Defendants waste of public funds, property, or manpower. 
In Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment [R. 239-263], Appellant did indicate that he was "terminated in connection with 
his reports that Mike Shaw had wasted public funds, property or manpower belonging to 
Defendant Washington City and had used them for personal gain." [R. 246]. While this claim 
mentions the "termination" that resulted from Appellant's reporting of Mike Shaw's actions, 
this is just a broad reference to fact that the ratification of the termination by the Appeals 
Board was in retaliation for Appellant's reporting at Mr. Johnson's hearing. 
Appellee argues that Appellant's mere reference to paragraphs 152-57 of the original 
Verified Complaint was insufficient to avoid summary judgment. However, in Pentecost v. 
Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah, 1985), the court held that a verified complaint, sworn to upon 
personal knowledge was sufficient to controvert an affidavit filed by a defendant in support 
of a motion for summary judgment. In Pentecost, a tenant sued the manager and the unknown 
owner(s) of the apartment in which she lived for forcibly evicting her and her two children 
and for retaining her furniture and personal possessions, all without resort to judicial 
process. The defendant property manager, filed a verified answrer to the tenant's verified 
complaint and later moved for summary judgment, supporting his motion with an affidavit. 
The tenant/plaintiff filed no counter-affidavit, relying instead on her complaint, which 
contradicted both defendants answer and the affidavit accompanying his motion for 
summary judgment. The district court granted the defendant's motion on the ground that no 
counter-affidavit had been filed. The Utah Supreme Court, however, held that the 
tenant/plaintiffs verified complaint, which controverted the facts set forth in the 
defendant's affidavit, created a material issue of fact for resolution at trial. Id. at 698-99. 
In Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Appellant refers directly to paragraphs 152-57 of the Verified Complaint. Those 
paragraphs unequivocally affirm that Appellant suffered an adverse employment action at 
the Appeals Board level because of his prior testimony against Mike Shaw at Mr. Johnson's 
own Appeals Board hearing. \R. 246] 
The affirmation in Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment that he was "terminated in connection with" reporting on Mike 
Shaw is admittedly a bit vague. However, this affirmation is followed by citation to 
paragraphs 152-57, which specifically controvert Appellee's argument that no adverse 
employment action had been taken because of Appellant's report of Mike Shaw's abuses. 
The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee when 
Appellant's Verified Complaint created direct issues of material fact 
2. The Appeals Board's scope of review and authority to provide remedies is 
limited. 
A. The Hatton-Ward decision clearly militates in favor of Appellant's 
position. 
Appellee characterizes the second issue on appeal as follows: "The district court 
lacked jurisdiction to review the Board's decision or the conduct of the hearing." This 
specific framing of the issue, however, is an over-simplification of what Appellant has 
actually argued in his brief-in-chief. 
Appellant's position is that a terminated municipal employee may challenge 
termination by filing for review with the designated appeal board and then may appeal a 
board's decision to the Court of Appeals for review. If the terminated employee opts for 
direct appellate review from an appeals board of the decision, then this Court would have 
jurisdiction to review such an appeal. However^ if such a review and/or appeal is not taken, the 
aggrieved employee may still have his or her general statutory, common law, or contract 
claims heard by a district court of general jurisdiction. 
Appellant's position also rests on the argument that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and 
1106 (hereinafter, sometimes referred to as "section 1105" and "section 1106") provide a 
specific and limited'review procedure and a limited panoply of remedies for aggrieved 
employees. In other words, the Legislature did not intend appeals boards established under 
section 1106 to serve as surrogate district courts or to limit a municipal employee's rights to 
file certain claims with a district court. 
In his brief-in-chief, Appellant cited extensively to Hatton-Ward v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, 828 P.2d 1071 (Utah App. 1992) because that case is the closest analogue to the 
present case. In Hatton-Ward, a former police officer brought a Whistleblower Act claim 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-1 against Salt Lake City Corporation ("City") and the 
Chief of Police. Hatton-Ward did not seek reinstatement of his position, but instead sought 
damages under the Whistleblower Act. Id, at 1072. 
The district court dismissed the suit because Hatton-Ward failed to "exhaust his 
administrative remedies" before the Civil Service Commission ("Commission") as required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012(2) provides in relevant part: 
Any person suspended or discharged may, within five days from the issuance 
by the head of the department of the order of suspension or discharge, appeal 
to the civil service commission, which shall fully hear and determine the 
matter. 
Once a matter is heard by the Commission and a final decision is entered, 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 provides that the civil service employee may appeal 
the decision to this Court: 
Any final action or order of the commission may be appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for review. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the 
issuance of the final action or order of the commission. The review by Court 
of Appeals shall be on the record of the commission and shall be for the 
purpose of determining if the commission has abused its discretion or 
exceeded its authority. 
The City argued (and the district court agreed) that Hatton-Ward did not 
comply with the administrative procedure set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012, 
and that therefore, the district court was precluded from hearing his WBA claim. 
In reversing the dismissal, this Court found that Hatton-Ward was not 
required to exhaust his administrative remedies by bringing the matter before the 
Commission prior to filing his claim in district court. 
This Court based its decision on the following factors: 
1. The language in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 does not specifically 
require an employee to first bring a WBA claim to the Commission 
before filing an action in state court. Such an implied requirement 
would make it difficult, if not impossible, to bring a claim in state court 
within the required 180 days of the alleged violation. 
2. The plain language of the WBA vests jurisdiction in the state court (not 
the Commission) to hear claims based on that Act. 
3. The language of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 allows the Commission 
and Court of Appeals to consider only the issue of whether the 
discharge should stand and related questions of back pay and seniority 
rights. Remedies such as attorney's fees, civil damages and civil fines 
are not mentioned and the Commission is not empowered to provide 
any remedy other than reinstatement 
4. The exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when the 
remedy sought is one that the administrative body is not empowered to 
provide. Hatton-Ward, 828 P.2d at 1073-74. 
In the instant case, Appellant readily acknowledges that the municipal employee 
provisions (found in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106) govern 
rather than the Civil Service Statute at issue in Hatton-Ward, Appellant also realizes that 
unlike Hatton-Ward (who bypassed the entire administrative process), Appellant did timely 
file a petition to appeal his termination to the Appeals Board and was allowed to present his 
arguments concerning the termination at the April 6, 2005 hearing. Finally, Appellant has 
multiple claims (including a WBA claim), whereas Hatton-Ward appears to have filed only a 
WBA claim. 
Notwithstanding the factual differences between the present case and Hatton-Ward, 
the analysis of the Civil Service Statute and the rationale underpinning the court's reversal of 
the district court in Hatton-Ward'are fully applicable to the present case on appeal. 
Appellee readily admits that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012.5 is "nearly identical to" 
Utah Code Ann § 10-3-1106, which is at issue in the present case. [Brief for Appellee 
Washington City, p. 36]. Both sections require the filing of an appeal to this Court within 30 
days of the issuance of the final action or order. Both sections indicate that this Court shall 
conduct a review of the "record" created at the administrative level to determine if the 
Commission (or appeal board as the case may be), "abused its discretion or exceeded its 
authority." 
While it is true that Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 provides that a municipal employee 
may be subject to a wider variety of negative employment actions (e.g. discharge, suspension 
over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less remuneration as 
provided by section 1106) than a civil service employee (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1012 
mentions only suspension and removal), both sections 1105 and 1012 specifically refer to a 
procedure whereby the employee may seek review of an adverse employment decision by an 
appellate body (the Commission in the case of section 1012 and an appeal board in the case 
of section 1105). As already noted, both of these review processes ultimately allow the 
aggrieved employee to seek review of any decision rendered by the appeal board or 
Commission by this Court. 
Due to the close proximity of the Civil Service Statute to the municipal employee 
statute—both as to location in Title 10, subsection 3 of the Utah Code, and as to structure 
and language—it is reasonable and appropriate to apply the Hatton-Ward analysis of the Civil 
Service Statute to the municipal employee statute at issue in this appeal. 
Each of the four major points relied upon by this Court in Hatton-Ward are equally 
applicable in this case: 
1. Other than the claim for reinstatement and back-wages, the language in 
section 1106 does not specifically require Appellant to first bring any of his 
other claims (including his WBA claim) to the Appeals Board before filing an 
action in state court. Even though Appellant did initially file a petition for 
review of his termination with the Appeals Board, nothing in section 1106 
mandates that he must bring other potential claims or continue the review 
process by appealing the Appeals Board decision to the Utah Court of Appeal. 
2. The plain language of the WBA vests jurisdiction in the state court (not the 
board of appeals) to hear claims based on that Act. Similarly, the UGIA 
provides that "[t]he district courts have exclusive, original jurisdiction over any 
action brought under this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-501. 
Accordingly, the district court has specific statutory jurisdiction over each of 
Appellant's claims (other than a claim for reinstatement and back pay). 
3. The language of section 1106 allows the board of appeals and Court of 
Appeals to consider only the issue of whether the discharge should stand and 
related questions of back pay and seniority rights. Remedies such as attorney's 
fees, civil damages and civil fines are not mentioned and the board of appeals 
is not empowered to provide any remedy other than reinstatement. 
4. The exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when the remedy 
sought is one that the administrative body is not empowered to provide. As 
this Court expressly noted in Hatton-Ward, the Commission was only 
statutorily empowered to determine whether the remedy of reinstatement was 
appropriate—not whether other damages, claims, remedies, attorney's fees or 
costs were warranted. Because the language of the municipal employee statute 
as codified in Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105 and 1106 grants the exact same 
limited remedy of reinstatement for reviewing appeals boards, the same 
reasoning applied in Hatton-Ward should apply in the instant case and 
Appellant should be entitled to bring his other claims before the district court. 
During the April 5, 2005 administrative hearing,1 the scope of the review by the 
Appeals Board was strictly for purposes of considering whether Appellant's termination was 
justified or whether he should be reinstated.2 The Appeals Board made no determination of 
the majority of Appellant's claims or remedies subsequently raised in his civil complaint 
(including Breach of Contract, Due Process, Unjust Enrichment, WBA, and Private 
Attorney General). 
Appellant's March 19, 2004 letter appealing his termination concludes with the 
following language: 
To avoid litigation I am requesting you revoke the termination, give me the 
months of retirement benefits I should have earned during my workers comp 
injury (9/1/03 to 2/9/04). I will then submit my resignation effective 2/9/04. 
I don't believe I am asking for anything I am not entitled to. If you have any 
questions please feel free to contact me. 
Appellant makes no mention of any other potential claims or issues—and in 
fact, the Appeals Board did not take evidence or make any decision with respect to all 
of the legal claims that were subsequendy raised when Appellant filed his Complaint 
1
 References to the April 6, 2005 administrative hearing conducted before the Washington 
City Employee Appeals Board in the Matter of the Appeal of the Termination of John Daniel 
Thorpe's Employmentare designated "[Admin. H. Tr. ]". Documents introduced during the 
administrative hearing are designated "[Admin. H. Ex. ] ." 
2
 Hearing Officer Bill Ronnow stated that ".. . [Appellant] was terminated by Washington 
City from his employment in Washington City, and pursuant to the personnel rules and 
regulations he has requested an appeal hearing. That's the purpose of this hearing." [Admin 
H. Tr. 6]. Bryan Pattison, counsel for Appellee stated ".. .the City had no choice but to 
terminate Mr. Thorpe's employment. Now, this was a reasonable decision, was a decision 
based on the evidence and cause, and this board should uphold that decision. [Admin H. Tr. 
9]. When reading the decision of the Appeals Board to uphold termination, Danice Bulloch 
stated "After deliberation of the Appeals Board in the purpose of the—determining whether 
the termination of Danny Thorpe was arbitrary and capricious or it was not supported by 
law, it was a unanimous affirming that the Washington City acted accordingly to the 
findings..." [Admin H. Tr. 180] 
in district court. 
In conclusion, the same rationale that supported this Court's reversal in 
Hatton-Wardis equally applicable to this case. The Appeals Board was not empowered 
to hear the subsequent claims brought by Appellant when he filed his Complaint. In 
any case, the Appeals Board did not consider those claims during the April 6, 2005 
hearing, but only the claim for reinstatement. Furthermore, Appellant was not 
required to appeal the Appeals Board's decision to this Court, and Appellant did not 
lose his right to bring his other claims before the district court simply because he did 
not appeal the issue of reinstatement to this Court. For these reasons, the district 
court erred in dismissing Appellant's claims. 
B. Section 1106 provides for review of the limited issue of whether the 
adverse employment action is justified and/or back pay is warranted. 
In its Brief, Appellee invokes concepts such as "constitutional limitations on district 
court jurisdiction" and "statutory construction" in arguing that section 1106 provides the 
exclusive legal recourse for a terminated municipal employee to bring any and all claims 
against an employer. Appellee asserts five points against Appellant's position that he had the 
right to pursue his various statutory and common-law claims in district court: 
1. Appellant's construction of section 1106 ignores the statute's plain language; 
2. Appellant's construction ignores the constitutional limitation on district court 
jurisdiction; 
3. Appellant's construction ignores the structure and purpose of the statute; 
4. Appellant's construction favors a general statute over a more specific one; 
5. Appellant's construction renders the statute superfluous. 
Appellant will address each of the foregoing points in order. 
i. Appellant's construction of section 1106 does not ignore or 
contradict the statute's plain language. 
While Appellee correcdy argues that the Utah Court of Appeals is the only court with 
authority to review a municipal employee appeals board decision (see Utah Code Ann. § 10-
3-1106(6)), Appellee mistakenly infers that this means that a municipal employee is required 
bring any and all claims (whether based in statute or common law) before the appeals board 
initially, and then, on direct review, to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
As already noted in this Reply Brief, this Court's decision in Hatton-Ward directly 
addressed the scope of review offered by both the Commission (under the Civil Service 
Statute) and the Utah Court of Appeals in cases involving the termination or suspension of 
civil servants. See Hatton-Ward, 828 P.2d at 1073-74. As with the Civil Service Statute, section 
1106 offers municipal employees the same sort of right to limited review to determine 
whether the adverse employment action was supportable. Furthermore, as with the Civil 
Service Statute, section 1106 permits appeals boards to offer a narrow remedy to an 
employee—reinstatement and salary reimbursement for any period of time that the 
employee was discharged, suspended, or transferred to a position if less remuneration. See 
Utah Code. Ann. § 10-3-1106(5) (b). Thus, the Appeals Board in this case has no authority to 
address penalties, damages, attorney's fees or costs afforded by other statutes, common law 
or contract claims. 
Appellee's mistaken assumption is that section 1106 grants broad authority to an 
appeals board to hear every possible claim that an aggrieved employee might have regardless of 
the legal basis for those claims and that the appeals board is the only body entided to initially 
adjudicate these claims. This assumption cannot be correct because it would require appeals 
boards to have the skill, knowledge and expertise to function, in essence, as district courts in 
understanding and applying a possibly complex variety of laws. The appeals boards simply 
do not have the level of training or knowledge to act as de facto district courts inasmuch as 
most of these boards are comprised of individuals who have had no legal training. 
Moreover, while section 1106 allows an appeal board to investigate a termination and 
an employee to confront witnesses and examine the evidence to be used at the review 
hearing, none of the formal procedural mechanisms (such as pleadings, motions, discovery) 
ensured by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure come in to play. It is unreasonable to suggest 
that the Legislature intended municipal employees to forfeit their right to vindicate all legal 
claims in a district court in favor of an administrative proceeding governed by boards that 
have limited or no legal experience and training. 
Appellee argues that the Legislature's failure to mention any other avenue of redress 
(e.g. the district court) in Section 1106 results means that the Legislature intends to 
affirmatively exclude any body other than the appeals boards from initially hearing and 
adjudicating every possible claim that an aggrieved employee might have. It is true that "under 
rules of statutory construction, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." See 
Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, f 14, 993 P.2d 875). However, Appellee's 
mistake is in supposing that Section 1106 governs every possible claim that an aggrieved 
employee might have rather than just a claim for reinstatement termination and past salary 
reimbursement as specifically permitted by section 1106. 
Appellant has no disagreement with the position that section 1106 provides a specific 
mechanism for municipal employees to seek review of a termination, suspension, or 
involuntary transfer through the appeals board process, with a final review by the Utah 
Court of Appeals. This route is available for an employee who might seek reinstatement 
and/or payment of back pay. Nevertheless, a former employee is not precluded from brining 
other statutory or common-law claims in district court, since the appeals board process can 
provide only the limited remedies of reinstatement and reimbursement of salary. This 
interpretation is entirely consistent with the plain meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-
1106(2)(a) which provides that an employee "may.. .appeal the discharge, suspension 
without pay, or involuntary transfer to.. .the appeal board..." 
ii. Appellant's construction of section 1106 does not ignore 
constitutional limitations on district court jurisdiction 
Appellee's constitutional argument can be summarized as follows: (1) in Utah, a 
district court's grant of original jurisdiction in all matters is limited by statute (i.e. district 
courts do not have unlimited jurisdiction), (2) Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 indicates that district 
courts have authority to review a lower tribunal's ruling only if provided by statute, (3) 
section 1106 contains no language that allows district courts the jurisdiction to review a 
decision by the appeals board. [Brief of Appellee, pp. 23-24]. 
Based on these three points, Appellee broadly extrapolates that district courts do not 
have "jurisdiction to review matters arising from municipal employee appeals boards." [Brief 
of Appellee, p. 24]. It is important to note that this conclusion rests upon an unstated (and 
mistaken) assumption3—that an appeals board created under section 1106 is statutorily 
3
 In fact, this somewhat muted assumption is the central flaw in each of Appellee's 
arguments based on statutory construction, constitutional limitations, superfluity (etc.). 
empowered to provide total and exclusive relief to an aggrieved employee for any and all claims 
that the employee may have. As previously argued, when applied to section 1106, the Hatton-
Ward decision easily disposes of this faulty assumption. 
Simply summarized, if a municipal employee chose to appeal her termination, 
suspension, or transfer to a lower-paid position, she would be entided to do so under section 
1106. The scope of such a review by the appeal board would possibly entail a period of 
investigation, culminating in a hearing where evidence may be provided and witnesses 
examined to allow the appeal board to "fully hear and determine the matter which relates to 
the cause for the discharge, suspension, or transfer." [Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii)]. 
If the appeals board found in favor of the employee, she would receive either (1) her salary 
for the period of time during which she was discharged or suspended without pay; or (2) any 
deficiency in salary for the period during which she was transferred to a position of less 
remuneration. [Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(5)(b)]. If the appeals board did not find in her 
favor, she would have recourse to the Utah Court of Appeals for review to determine 
whether the appeals board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority. [Utah Code Ann. § 
10-3-1106(6)]. 
Nothing in the applicable language gives the appeals board any jurisdictional authority 
other than to review whether the adverse employment action was supportable and to order 
payment of back pay if the action was not. Even in the instant case, where Appellant did file 
for review of his termination, section 1106 does not require an employee to consolidate any 
and all claims, regardless of their nature or bases, into the appeals board review process. An 
employee is fully entided to have other statutory, contract or common-law claims heard by a 
district court. 
An employee could ostensibly forego any request for reinstatement or review (as the 
plaintiff did in Hatton-Ward), and proceed directly to district court to file any number of 
statutory, common-law, or contractual claims. Alternatively, an employee might seek review 
and reinstatement by initiating the section 1106 process. If the appeals board affirmed the 
termination, there is nothing in section 1106 that requires the employee to seek review by 
the Utah Court of Appeals of the appeals board decision. In fact, the only reason that an 
employee would proceed to the Utah Court of Appeals would be for the end purpose of 
having the Court reverse the appeals board and permit reinstatement and/or order the 
payment of any owing salary. 
iii. Appellant's construction of section 1106 does not ignore the 
structure and purpose of the statute. 
Appellee both misunderstands and misrepresents Appellant's position. As previously 
argued, section 1106 is permissive in that a terminated employee is /^/required to seek 
reinstatement and back pay. A terminated employee may proceed to district court with any 
number of statutory, contract, or common law claims if he did not seek to be reinstated. 
Alternatively, if a terminated employee wished to seek reinstatement and back pay, he 
would be required to follow the procedure outlined in 1106 and petition the designated 
appeal board. However, even if a terminated employee initially sought reinstatement through 
review, he would not forfeit his right to bring claims based on other statutes or law (at any 
stage of the review process) where the remedy ultimately sought was not one that an appeal board could 
grant. Thus, section 1106 would only require an employee to appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals if he still wished to be reinstated and/or paid back pay after being denied such by 
the appeals board. If the employee wished to seek other remedies not contemplated by 
section 1106 such as statutory damages, attorney's fees, or other penalties after his appeal to 
the appeals board was denied, he would be entitled to do so and would not be limited to an 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Appellee goes to great lengths to show that the word "may" is not always permissive. 
[Brief of Appellee, pp. 24-28]. Well and good; but Appellee has proverbially strained at a 
gnat and swallowed a camel. 
Utah courts recognize several exceptions to the standard requirement that a party 
must exhaust his administrative remedies. Exhaustion is not required where: (1) there is 
irreparable injury, (2) there is a likelihood of oppression or injustice, (3) exhaustion would 
serve no purpose, or is futile, or (4) an administrative agency or officer has acted outside of 
the scope of its defined, statutory authority. See Salt hake City Mission v. Salt Lake City 
2008 UT 31, H7,184P.3d599. 
The question is whether Appellant was still required to appeal his termination to the 
Court of Appeals once he decided that he did not wish to seek reinstatement of his 
employment, but to sue based on other legal theories. Appellant asserts that once he 
determined that he would not seek reinstatement, he was entitled to bring his other claims 
because the exhaustion of his remedy (i.e. appealing to the Utah Court of Appeals) would 
serve no purpose and because the specific remedies (damages, fees, etc.) sought by Appellant 
were not ones that the Appeals Board or the Utah Court of Appeals could provide. 
This is reason why Appellant has argued that term "may" in section 1106 with respect 
to an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals is permissive. 
iv. Appellant's construction of section 1106 does not impermissibly 
favor a general statute over a more specific one* 
At the outset, it is important to correct Appellee's characterization of Appellant's 
claim as a mere "wrongful discharge" claim. Although such a simplification and conflation 
of Appellant's actual claims is convenient for Appellee and helps "grease the wheels" of its 
argument, Appellant is entitled by law to formulate and assert his own claims in a way he 
deems fit. It is not the Appellee's place to re-define what Appellant has actually asserted and 
claimed. 
Appellee labors to emphasize a conflict between Appellant's interpretation of the 
applicability of the UGIA to the present case and section 1106. In fact, no conflict exists. An 
individual who was seeking reinstatement of his position as a municipal employee would be 
entitled to utilize the review process contained in 1106. That individual wx>uld have no need 
to resort to the UGIA because he would not be seeking to sue a governmental entity (or 
employee of the entity) at that juncture—he would be seeking reemployment. On the other 
hand, an individual who chose not to seek reinstatement (or abandoned the effort during the 
review process) would be required to follow the strictures of the UGIA, including the filing 
of a notice of claim. 
The question of whether the government may be immune from certain claims under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-201 and Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-7-301 is not at issue in this appeal. 
Appellant has articulated six causes of action which remain active in his original Verified 
Complaint. Appellee is not entided to make a new immunity challenge for the first time on 
appeal. 
v. Appellant's construction of section 1106 does not render the 
municipal employee statute superfluous. 
At the risk of belaboring a point that has been repeated throughout this Reply Brief, 
Appellant has clearly explained how section 1106 is both useful and economical in situations 
where a municipal employee wishes to challenge an adverse employment action and to be 
reinstated and/or receive back pay. Section 1106 provides a more expeditious and less-
expensive way for the employee to challenge the reasons for the termination, suspension or 
transfer. 
Importandy, section 1106 prohibits an employee from being discharged, suspended 
without pay or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration because of the 
employee's political or religious beliefs or when officers, governing bodies or department 
heads are changed (i.e. arbitrary or politically/religiously motivated adverse employment 
actions). 
If for example, an employee was terminated due to her religious beliefs, ostensibly 
she could petition for review in hopes of the appeal board overturning the decision and 
reinstating her. If the appeal board upheld the decision to terminate, certainly she could 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals for review. Alternatively^ the employee would not be 
foreclosed from bringing any state or federal statutory claims related to the discriminatory 
action and would not be precluded from doing so just because she had initially sought 
reinstatement. 
Section 1106 contains no language that would indicate that it is preclusive (other 
than that an employee seeking reinstatement or back pay must petition for review) or that it 
provides the sole recourse for an employee who may have wide and sundry claims resulting 
from his employment or from the adverse employment action. 
Accordingly, section 1106 serves a definite and useful purpose for municipal 
employees who want their jobs back, their suspensions or job transfers reconsidered. For 
those employees who seek other remedies and/or who do not want reinstatement, an 
appeals board consisting of individuals who are not trained in law or procedure, is not the 
"last stop." 
C. Section 1106 does serve a public policy interest, but not to the exclusion 
of municipal employees' right to vindicate their claims. 
Appellee posits a reasonable argument in favor of the benefits of having a 
streamlined review process for municipal employees who wish to appeal an adverse 
employment action. Nevertheless, when pushed to it's logical limits, Appellee's position (if 
adopted) would mean that a municipal employee would never have the ability to bring claims 
(including state and federal statutory claims) of any sort before a competent court of general 
jurisdiction. Instead, that employee would have to present all of his claims, no matter what 
the level of complexity or sophistication, before an appeals board for determination. 
It is interesting to note that Appellee never seems to go so far in its Brief as to say 
that the type of claims or issues that an employee might bring before an appeals board are 
limited in any way; but certainly, Appellee does think that regardless of the type of claims or 
issues involved, the appeals board is the "gatekeeper" on the path to any remedy that the 
employee might seek. As pointed out earlier in this Brief, Hatton-Ward disposes of this 
position. Simply stated, there are some claims and issues that an appeals board cannot and 
should not hear—if only because the remedy sought cannot be awarded by such a board. 
Obviously, a balance must be struck between providing a streamlined process for 
municipal government employees (and the municipalities themselves) to address conflicts 
over termination, suspension, or transfers and the rights of an individual open access to 
court and to vindicate claims. Section 1106 serves a definite purpose in striking the balance. 
Appellee fails to consider that on occasion, the review process might actually result in an 
agreeable solution for both the employee and the municipality, thus reducing the time and 
expense of a fully-fledged lawsuit. In any case, the section 1106 review process helps correct 
any obvious and clear situations where the adverse employment action was based on 
something like political, religious or internal disagreement. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment on those 
claims outlined herein. 
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April 2010. 
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Addendum 1 
Determinative Statutes 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
10-3-1012, Suspension or discharge by department head — Appeal to 
commission — Hearing and decision. 
(1) All persons in the classified civil service may be suspended as provided in 
Section 10-3-912, or removed from office or employment by the head of the 
department for misconduct, incompetency, failure to perform duties, or failure to 
observe properly the rules of the department, but subject to appeal by the suspended 
or discharged person to the civil service commission. 
(2) Any person suspended or discharged may, within five days from the issuance 
by the head of the department of the order of suspension or discharge, appeal to the 
civil service commission, which shall fully hear and determine the matter. 
(3) The suspended or discharged person shall be entitled to appear in person and 
to have counsel and a public hearing. 
(4) The finding and decision of the civil service commission upon the hearing shall 
be certified to the head of the department from whose order the appeal is taken, and 
shall be final and immediately enforced by the head. 
10-3-1012.5. Appeal to Court of Appeals — Scope of review. 
Any final action or order of the commission may be appealed to the Court of 
Appeals for review. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of the issuance 
of the final action or order of the commission. The review by Court of Appeals shall 
be on the record of the commission and shall be for the purpose of determining if 
the commission has abused its discretion or exceeded its authority. 
10-3-1105. Municipal employees — Duration and termination of employment -
- Exceptions. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), each employee of a municipality shall 
hold employment without limitation of time, being subject to discharge, suspension 
of over two days without pay, or involuntary transfer to a position with less 
remuneration only as provided in Section 10-3-1106. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to: 
(a) an officer appointed by the mayor or other person or body exercising executive 
power in the municipality; 
(b) a member of the municipality's police department or fire department who is a 
member of the classified civil service in a first or second class city; 
(c) a police chief of the municipality; 
(d) a deputy police chief of the municipality; 
(e) a fire chief of the municipality; 
(£) a deputy or assistant fire chief of the municipality; 
(g) a head of a municipal department; 
(h) a deputy of a head of a municipal department; 
(i) a superintendent; 
(j) a probationary employee of the municipality; 
(k) a part-time employee of the municipality; or 
(T) a seasonal employee of the municipality. 
(3) Nothing in this section or Section 10-3-1106 may be construed to limit a 
municipality's ability to define cause for an employee termination or reduction in 
force. 
10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer — 
Appeals — Board — Procedure. 
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, 
suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less 
remuneration: 
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or 
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, 
or heads of departments. 
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without 
pay, or involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less remuneration 
for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the discharge, 
suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to be known as the appeal 
board, established under Subsection (7). 
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee 
shall exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing 
to the board. 
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of 
the appeal with the municipal recorder within 10 days after: 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee 
receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance 
procedure; or 
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the 
discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3) (a), the municipal recorder 
shall forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the appeal board. 
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board 
shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and fully hear 
and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge, suspension, or 
transfer. 
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may: 
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel; 
(b) have a public hearing; 
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and 
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be 
certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, 
except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent. 
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee 
shall receive: 
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is 
discharged or suspended without pay; or 
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was 
transferred to a position of less remuneration. 
(6) (a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of 
Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review. 
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6) (a) shall be filed within 30 days after the 
issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board. 
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and 
for the purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded 
its authority. 
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, the 
number of members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for 
conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the governing 
body of each municipality by ordinance. 
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-
mayor form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal 
Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the 
governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
